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The actions of others, and what others approve of, can be a powerful tool for promoting pro-
environmental behavior. A potential barrier to the utility of social norms, however, are 
cognitive biases in how people perceive themselves and others, including the better-than-
average effect. This effect describes the tendency for people to think they are exceptional, 
especially when compared with their peers. To investigate the role of the better-than-average 
effect in pro-environmental behavior, we administered questions as part of a larger online 
survey of 5,219 nationally representative Australians. Participants were asked to report 
whether they engaged in a list of 21 pro-environmental behaviors, and then asked to estimate 
how their engagement compared with that of the average Australian. Over half of our 
participants self-enhanced; they overestimated their engagement in pro-environmental 
behaviors relative to others. Self-enhancement was related to reduced perceptions of personal 
harm from climate change, more favourable assessments of coping ability, less guilt, and 
lower moral and ethical duty to take action to prevent climate change. These relationships 
held when participants sceptical about anthropogenic climate change were removed from 
analyses. We discuss the implications of the findings for the use of social norms in promoting 
pro-environmental behavior.  
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Overestimating One’s ‘Green’ Behavior: Better-Than-Average Bias May Function to Reduce 
Perceived Personal Threat from Climate Change 
People’s behavioral responses to contested social issues are shaped by their attitudes, 
and climate change is no exception (Corner, Markowitz, & Pidgeon, 2014; Hornsey, Harris, 
Bain, & Fielding, 2016). In turn, people’s attitudes are shaped in part by perceptions of what 
others think and do (Tankard & Paluck, 2016). These perceptions are often subject to 
distortion, both from ‘external’ sources, such as media representations of an issue (Boykoff, 
2014), and ‘internal’ psychological processes (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977; Shamir & 
Shamir, 1997). Such distortions operate in the perception of community opinion about 
climate change, whereby people tend to overestimate levels of scepticism in the broader 
community (Leviston, Walker, & Morwinski, 2013). Similar research suggests people 
underestimate how much others care about the environment, and overestimate the stigma 
associated with acting environmentally (Bouman & Steg, 2019; Klas, Zinkiewicz, Zhou, & 
Clarke, 2018). In the current research, we investigate whether misperceptions about what 
others think in relation to climate change extends to misperceptions about what others are 
doing to combat climate change, relative to one’s own actions. Specifically, we investigate 
whether a cognitive bias – the better-than-average effect – operates in the domain of pro-
environmental behavior, investigate its possible functions, and explore the implications of its 
presence for appealing to environmental norms. 
     The ‘better-than-average effect’ (Alicke, 1985) describes the tendency for people to 
think of themselves as exceptional, especially in relation to their peers (Brown, 2012). This 
effect, also termed self-enhancement bias, uniqueness bias, or illusory superiority, manifests 
in the tendency for people to think of themselves as more virtuous and moral, more 
compassionate and understanding, and (paradoxically) as less biased than their average 
human counterpart (Brown, 2012; Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004; Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 




2004). The effect extends to generous self-assessments of one’s skill and capability in 
specific situations. In a classic example, US and Swedish students were asked to assess their 
own driving ability relative to peers; 88% of US participants and 77% of Swedish participants 
considered themselves to be safer than the average driver (Svenson, 1981). More recently, the 
effect has been found to operate in self-other assessments of leadership abilities (Foster, 
Clarke, & Packard Jr, 2018), intelligence (Heck, Simons, & Chabris, 2018), and prejudice 
(Howell & Ratliff, 2017). In this latter study, people generally believed they were less 
prejudiced than others and, when given feedback about their apparent bias, responded 
defensively. Defensive responding was most pronounced for those initially believing they 
were better-than-average (in this case, less prejudiced). 
 One explanation for the better-than-average effect stems from a cognitive perspective. 
People use themselves as reference points, as they are most privy to their own behaviors, 
thoughts, and capabilities. This reference point acts as an anchor from which people 
insufficiently adjust, as they lack the informational database about other people’s behaviors, 
thoughts, skills, and capabilities (Kruger, 1999). Building upon this cognitive perspective, 
others (e.g., Brown, 2012) have stressed the role of motivational forces in shaping 
inaccuracies, such as a desire to enhance and maintain feelings of self-worth; it makes people 
feel good to believe they are above average. Thus, people have a tendency to seek out 
comparisons that are self-exonerating. Critically, these ‘downward social comparisons’ are 
more likely to be made when the individual wants to reduce threat and enhance the self 
(Woods, 1989).  
If the better-than-average effect performs important functions for self-esteem 
maintenance, we would expect the effect to manifest in the context of self-other assessments 
of pro-environmental behavior. Information about climate change has been demonstrated to 
induce threat, feelings of helplessness, guilt, and reduced efficacy, which can in turn trigger 




defensive or compensatory reactions in an effort to reduce negative emotions and feelings of 
personal culpability (Kellstedt, Zahran, & Vedlitz, 2008; Witte & Allen, 2000). Moreover, 
making climate change proximal or salient does not necessarily translate to increased pro-
environmental behavioral engagement, and other strategies are often employed to deal with 
the unpleasant feelings aroused by climate change, including bolstered efficacy beliefs 
(Brügger, Dessai, Devine-Wright, Morton, & Pidgeon, 2015; Hornsey et al., 2015). Brügger 
et al. (2015) suggest that climate change information may not only influence risk and efficacy 
perceptions, but also threaten psychological resources such as positive self-worth, especially 
under conditions where individuals’ potential role in contributing to climate change is made 
salient. Accordingly, we propose that climate change provides the necessary motivational 
impetus to reduce negative emotions through a self-exonerating process; specifically, through 
proclamations that people are doing their fair share or more than others. These self-other 
assessments may in turn license the individual to continue pursuing less climate-friendly 
behaviors (e.g., driving a motor vehicle, eating meat), reduce threat and negative affect, and 
bolster efficacy beliefs associated with climate change and its impacts.   
The implications of better-than-average effects, if found to operate in this context, are 
important for social normative communication. Not only might distortions about one’s own 
environmental performance relative to others excuse poorer subsequent behaviors via moral 
licensing, but it may also render community-level social normative messaging designed to 
appeal to poor performers ineffective.     
The Current Study 
 We suggest that the better-than-average effect will operate in the context of pro-
environmental behaviors, such that: 
1) people will tend to perceive themselves as making greater behavioral contributions 
than others make;  




2) distorted perceptions of one’s own behavior relative to others will be associated with 
feelings of threat from climate change, as measured by climate change causation 
belief, perceived harm from climate change, and perceived ability to cope with the 
impacts of climate change; 
3) distorted perceptions will be associated with levels of climate-related guilt and moral 
and ethical duty to respond to climate change;  
4) distorted perceptions will be associated with separate assessments of perceived social 
norms, such that those who think they are better-than-average will be  
a. less likely to think those around them perform many pro-environmental 
behaviors (descriptive norm); and, 
b. more likely to think those around them think they should engage in pro-
environmental behavior (injunctive norm) 
Method 
Participants and Procedure  
Survey items testing the better-than-average effect were administered as part of a 
larger five-part longitudinal survey run by Australia’s Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) tracking attitudes to climate change. Reporting of 
the main descriptive results from these five surveys is available at Leviston, Greenhill, and 
Walker (2015). For the current study, undertaken as the fourth in the series of five surveys, a 
total of 5,219 Australians completed the survey online. Participants were recruited from an 
online survey panel managed by The Online Research Unit and were representative of the 
national population across major demographics based on Australian Census data (Table 1). 
Participants’ spread of ages approximated that of the Australian population, and roughly 
equal proportions of females (51.4%) and males (48.6%) completed the survey. Participants 
came from a diverse range of locations, consistent with the spread of the Australian 




population, with 57.6% of participants residing in capital cities, 27.1% in regional areas, and 
12.4% in rural areas.  
Measures 
 Pro-environmental behavior index. Participants were asked about their engagement 
in each of 21 actions with significance for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. For 
each behavior, participants were asked if to indicate whether they performed each action, 
with the following response options for each item: ‘yes, mostly for environmental reasons’, 
‘yes, mostly for other reasons’, and ‘I don’t do this’. Responses of “yes” (either for 
environmental or for other reasons) were summed to create an overall behavior index, with 
possible index scores ranging from zero to 21.  See Table 2 for a full list of these behaviors 
and the percentage of participants who reported engaging in each one (either for 
environmental or for other reasons).  
 Estimated behavior. Participants were then asked to think about the behaviors as a 
whole in the previous question and indicate whether they thought they did much more, did a 
bit more, did about the same, did a bit less, or did a lot less than the average Australian. 
Participants selected the category that best described their estimate.    
Climate change beliefs. Participants were asked to select one of four statements that 
best described their thoughts on climate change. The four statements were: I don’t think that 
climate change is happening; I have no idea whether climate change is happening or not; I 
think that climate change is happening, but it’s just a natural fluctuation in Earth’s 
temperatures; I think that climate change is happening, and I think that humans are largely 
causing it.  
Perceived harm from climate change. Participants indicated how much they thought 
climate change would harm them personally on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 4 (a great deal).  




Perceived ability to cope with climate change. Participants indicated the extent to 
which they thought they would be able to cope with the impacts of climate change 
financially, physically, mentally, and overall. Responses to the four items were recorded on a 
scale from 1 (Not cope at all) to 5 (Cope perfectly) and were averaged to form a single index 
of perceived ability to cope (α = .91).   
Moral and ethical duty. Moral and ethical duty to respond to climate change was 
measured with two items (i.e., I feel a moral duty to do something about climate change; I 
feel it is my ethical responsibility to change my individual behavior to combat climate 
change). Reponses were recorded on a scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree) 
and were averaged to form a single index (α = .78).  
  Guilt. Participants indicated the extent to which they agreed or disagreed that the 
issue of climate change made them feel guilty on a scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 
(Strongly agree). 
Descriptive and injunctive norms. Descriptive norms were measured with four 
items assessing the extent to which participants agreed or disagreed that most people in their 
social network, family, and community, and most people who were important to them did 
many of these behaviors. Injunctive norms were measured with four items assessing the 
extent to which participants agreed or disagreed that most people in their social network, 
family, and community, and most people who were important to them thought they (i.e., 
participants) should do many of these behaviors. Responses to both sets of items were 
recorded on a scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). Responses were 









 Pro-environmental behavior index scores spanned the full range from 0 to 21 and 
were normally distributed, with a slightly peaked clustering in the center (M = 11.89, SD = 
4.44; skewness = .06, kurtosis = .19).  
Just over half of participants (52.1%) responded they did about the same as the 
average Australian. A small percentage of participants thought they did a bit less (5.0%) or a 
lot less (1.3%) than the average Australian. By contrast, a third (33.6%) thought they did a bit 
more, and a further 8.0% thought they did a lot more than the average Australian.  
As an initial test of the relationship between participants’ behavior index scores and 
self-other assessments, we performed a median split based on pro-environmental behavior 
index scores. For those who scored below the median, fewer than 10% considered their own 
behavioral engagement as lower than the average person’s, while 26.7% considered their 
engagement to be higher, which contrasts with 3.4% and 55.2% for participants who scored 
above the median on self-reported behavior.     
To probe these relationships further, we then split participants into five roughly even 
groups on the basis of their reported behavior relative to the behavior of other participants in 
the survey (much less than other participants, a bit less, about the same, a bit more, and a lot 
more). Participants’ behavioral index scores were then cross-tabulated with their estimated 
behavior relative to the average Australian (i.e., their selection of ‘much less’, ‘a bit less’, 
‘about the same’, ‘a bit more’, and ‘a lot more’). Table 3 shows the percentage of survey 
participants who fell within each cross-tabulated cell. The shading in each cell indicate three 
different patterns of estimation of one’s own performance relative to others: accurate (light 
grey cells), self-deprecating (white cells), or self-enhancing (dark grey cells). Just under one-
quarter (21.5%) were deemed to be accurate assessors: given their self-reported behavior, 
their assessment of where they stood in relation to others was reasonably accurate. The same 




number (21.5%) were deemed to be self-deprecating: they undervalued their comparative 
performance. Over half of participants (57.1%) were deemed to be self-enhancing: they 
tended to overestimate their performance in relation to others.1 
Chi-square analysis revealed that patterns of self-assessment were significantly 
related to beliefs about climate change, though the effect size was small, χ2 (6, n = 5219) = 
85.72, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .09 (see Table 4). Self-enhancers were the most prevalent 
group regardless of belief type, although they were slightly more populous among those who 
thought climate change was not happening or was due to natural causes. Interestingly, those 
who did not know about the causes of climate change had the greatest proportion of self-
deprecators, although they represented a relatively small proportion of the overall sample.  
  One-way ANOVAs revealed that those deemed self-enhancers scored significantly 
lower on perceived personal harm from climate change, reported greater ability to cope 
(though the effect size was small), reported less guilt, and lower moral and ethical duty to 
respond to climate change, than did accurate assessors and self-deprecators. Accurate 
assessors and self-deprecators differed only on levels of guilt, which was highest for self-
deprecators (see Table 5).  
In line with expectations, self-enhancers were less likely than accurate assessors and 
self-deprecators to think those around them performed many of those behaviors. Contrary to 
our expectations, self-enhancers were also less likely to think that others thought they ought 
to perform those behaviors (Table 5).2 
 
 
1  The term ‘self-enhancing’ in the current context refers to the motivational tendency to self-enhance, and is 
distinct from the ‘self-enhancement’ value dimension in Schwartz (2012) and others’ human values work. 
2 Although beliefs about climate change causation can be considered a dimension of threat reduction, we 
repeated our analyses with only those who accepted anthropogenic climate change (n = 2470) to control for 
variance attributable to climate change scepticism. Our initial findings were replicated, although with slightly 
reduced effect sizes for harm, guilt, moral and ethical duty, and descriptive norms.  
 





The majority of our participants evidenced better-than-average tendencies. Our 
findings are consistent with previous literature from other domains (e.g., Heck et al., 2018; 
Howell & Ratliff, 2017; Svenson, 1981) and provide good initial evidence that better-than-
average effects operate in the domain of pro-environmental behavior. The bias was not 
restricted to people who performed poorly, or to those holding certain beliefs about climate 
change, but was evident across a spectrum of behavior and attitudes. Moreover, distorted 
perceptions about one’s own behavior was related to factors such as moral and ethical duty to 
respond to climate change, climate-related guilt, coping appraisals, and descriptive and 
injunctive norms. In each case we found that a self-other comparison that flattered the 
participant tended to be accompanied by attitudes that function to reduce threats posed by 
climate change and reduce personal culpability. Taken together, the results suggest better-
than-average effects might serve a palliative function for the individual.  
 The tendency for self-enhancers to downgrade personal perceived harm from climate 
change and bolster personal coping ability relative to other groups might also be understood 
as optimism bias – the belief that negative events are more likely to happen to others than to 
oneself (Radcliffe & Klein, 2002). This form of bias is itself functional, as it aids in restoring 
feelings of efficacy and control. Coupled with findings that self-enhancers reported lower 
feelings of guilt and moral and ethical duty, it is arguable that better-than-average 
assessments are not necessarily causative but one of an interrelated set of motivated 
cognitions to reduce both internal and external threat (Hornsey et al., 2015).  
Motivations to self-enhance may also have interpersonal underpinnings and benefits. 
For instance, Kurz, Prosser, Rabinovich, and O’Neill (2020) argue that tightly defined 
behaviors, such as veganism and cycling, implicitly signal moral judgments to those who do 
not partake in these behaviors. Our list of pro-environmental behaviors included both loosely 




and tightly specified behaviors. In order to restore moral worth, it is feasible that those whose 
inaction is made salient in specific behavioral areas become motivated to make downward 
social comparisons (‘I may not be perfect, but I’m better than most’). Self-enhancement may 
thus have a moral licensing effect (Mazar & Zhong, 2010; Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010), 
allowing the assessor to concurrently admit to unstainable behaviors (driving a motor vehicle, 
regularly eating meat) while maintaining moral standing within the broader community. 
Further research might test whether better-than-average effects are heightened under 
conditions where indicating high behavioral engagement is made more difficult. Similarly, 
future research employing longitudinal or experimental designs might illuminate whether 
self-other assessments are dynamic or whether they reflect more general chronic 
predispositions toward bias.    
Implications for Environmental Communication 
The findings have several important implications for communicators seeking to 
harness social norms to generate greater uptake of environmentally friendly behavior. First, 
the effectiveness of broad appeals based on descriptive norms is likely to be diluted if the 
targets of such campaigns are unaware that their own behavior ranks poorly in relation to the 
actual norm. Self-enhancers are unlikely to realise that they are self-enhancing, and 
downward social comparisons may perpetuate behavioral disengagement through 
misconstrued norms. 
In order for people to accurately estimate their relative environmental contribution, it 
is critical they are exposed to accurate information on what others do. This could be achieved 
by increasing the visibility of pro-environmental behaviors. A successful example of this is 
the use of feedback through utility bills, whereby households are compared with other similar 
households in the neighbourhood (Allcott & Mullainathan, 2010).  A caveat is that normative 
communication might also have unintended impacts for people we classified in this study as 




self-deprecators. Previous research has shown that providing accurate descriptive norms to 
good performers should be done with caution, as it can result in rebound effects as people 
revise their behavior to more closely align to the newly learned descriptive norm (Allcott, 
2011; Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007). Conversely, presenting 
self-deprecators with normative information that reveals their relatively good behavior may 
have peculiarly beneficial effects for those low in environmental identity; reminding people 
of their own pro-environmental behavior has indeed been found to foster a sense of 
environmental identity, which in turn may translate into a heightened injunctive imperative to 
sustain one’s actions (Bem, 1972; van der Werff, Steg, & Keizer, 2014).  
While we anticipated self-enhancers would tend to think those around them 
performed relatively fewer behaviors, we did not anticipate the discounted assessment of 
what they believed others thought they should do. This suggests that downward, or self-
exonerating comparisons, extend beyond beliefs about what others do, to beliefs about what 
others think. More practically, it suggests that, in addition to providing people with accurate 
information about what others do, accurate feedback concerning what others think is equally 
important. An emerging line of research suggests people overestimate levels of anti-
environmentalism and stigma attached to certain environmental behaviors (e.g., Klas et al., 
2018). Assuring people of emerging injunctive norms of environmentalism, that increasingly 
people are ‘on board’ with combating climate change, are likely to be important in 
combatting tendencies to overestimate the stigma attached to environmental behaviors. Again 
though, as Kurz et al. (2020) note, the highly moralised nature of certain behaviors can lead 
to negative emotions such as moral outrage among those who do not engage in the behaviors. 
Hence messaging of injunctive norms should also proceed with caution.  
Finally, we acknowledge the complicating role of environmental identities in the 
persuasiveness of communication leveraging descriptive and injunctive norms (e.g., 




Göckeritz et al., 2010; Kantola, Syme, & Campbell, 1984; Schultz et al., 2016). We suggest 
research in these traditions extend to encompass interactions with self-other assessments, to 
arrive at more universally effective pro-environmental messaging.   
Limitations and Future Directions  
Several limitations of the current research should be acknowledged. First, the data are 
cross-sectional; hence causality can only be implied. Longitudinal and experimental designs 
are necessary to uncover the precise mechanisms through which better-than-average biases 
operate, whether they can be mitigated, and whether they have certain antecedents, most 
notably environmental (and other) identities.  
 Second, as previously mentioned, the pro-environmental behaviors investigated here 
comprised a mix of loosely specified and more concrete behaviors. Self-reported loosely 
specified behaviors (e.g., ‘usually’ fixing things rather than replacing them, ‘changing’ one’s 
gardening practices) are arguably more prone to socially desirable responding than more 
concrete behaviors (e.g., installing a rainwater tank or insulation). The possibility that, by 
including loosely specified behaviors, subsequent advantageous self-other assessments were 
primed or bolstered cannot be discounted. We suggest future research counterbalance the 
measurement of one’s own behavioral engagement and self-other assessments to investigate 
any influence of social desirability bias on better-than-average assessments. Such research 
might also investigate patterns of self-other assessments for specific groupings of behavior; 
for example, are better-than-average effects attenuated for concrete behaviors, and might 
such attenuation have its own unique consequences for subsequent self-other assessments for 
loosely specified behaviors?         
 Third, we acknowledge that a significant minority of participants in the current study 
(43%) did not evidence clear better-than-average effects in the domain of pro-environmental 
behavior. Stronger evidence for the effect has been shown elsewhere, for instance, 77-88% of 




respondents in Svenson’s (1981) driving self-assessments showed better-than-average effects, 
and 65% showed better-than-average effects in Heck et al.’s (2018) self-assessments of 
intelligence. This runs somewhat counter to theoretical assumptions that uniqueness bias is a 
general and universal tendency, although the current findings might be partially attributable 
to the lack of granularity in our estimated behavior measure3. Further research, including 
cross-cultural research, might investigate whether those who self-enhance (or self-deprecate) 
in an environmental domain show similar propensities in other behavioral domains. The 
precise role of environmental identity would be particularly pertinent to such cross-domain 
investigations.  
Conclusion 
We investigated better-than-average effects on a large, nationally representative 
sample, something which is often lacking in sustainable consumption research (Richardson, 
Ginn, Prosser, Fernando, & Judge, 2020), and which allowed us to test distorted perceptions 
against a representative baseline of reported behaviors.  
We suggest a more targeted approach to normative messaging is warranted—one that 
acknowledges the pervasive role of the better-than-average effect in people’s assessments of 
their pro-environmental behavior. Such an approach would account for interrelationships 
between the effects of descriptive and injunctive normative messaging, environmental 
identity, and, critically, the accuracy of people’s perceptions of their own behavior relative to 
others. 
       
  
 
3 Many studies testing better-than-average effects do not allow respondents to indicate that they are average, or 
about average, and force an enhancing or deprecating response (e.g., Heck, Simons, & Chabris, 2018). Other 
studies employ response scales measured at finer levels, such as from 1 to 100 (Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004). 
Both these methods may increase the likelihood that respondents make, or are deemed to have made, a self-
enhancing assessment.   
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Demographic Characteristics of Participants 
Demographic Category % of Participants Australian Population % 
Age  <24 7.3 10.7 
 25–34 15.7 18.3 
 35–44 16.0 18.9 
 45–54 16.7 18.2 
 55–64 20.3 15.4 
 65–74 19.0 10.0 
 75+ 5.0 8.5 
Gender Male 48.6 49.4 
 Female 51.4 50.6 
Location Capital city 57.6 65.2 (capital city) 
 Regional town 27.1 17.4 (significant urban area) 
 Rural area 12.4 17.4 (other) 
Note. N = 5219. 
  





Percentage of Participants Reporting Engagement in Pro-environmental Behaviors 
Behavior % of Participants 
I switch lights off around the house whenever possible 95.3 
I have reduced the amount of water I use around the house and garden 88.7 
I will usually try to fix things rather than replace them 88.4 
I have reduced the amount of gas and/or electricity I use around the house 87.2 
Where possible, I buy products that are made locally 83.3 
I recycle/ compost as much household waste as possible 81.7 
Most of my cleaning products are environmentally friendly 76.8 
I have switched to products that are more environmentally friendly 75.2 
I have reduced the amount of petrol I use  70.3 
I have installed insulation in my home 62.4 
I usually walk/cycle/carpool/take public transport 59.9 
I have changed my gardening practices 52.3 
I have reduced my amount of air travel 41.9 
I have installed a rain water tank on my property 40.4 
I have changed my diet  37.6 
I have installed a solar hot water system, or solar panels, in my house 37.0 
I am on Green Power electricity 32.2 
I have installed a grey water recycling system on my property 21.0 
I buy carbon-offsets to reduce my carbon footprint 20.4 
I have taken part in a political campaign about an environmental issue 18.9 
I have contacted a government member about climate change 18.0 
 






Self-reported Versus Estimates of Self Relative to Others’ Pro-Environmental Behavior  
  
























1. Do much more 
than the average 
Australian 
0.6 1.3 1.4 1.9 2.9 8.0 
2. Do a bit more 
than the average 
Australian 
2.6 8.2 8.3 6.9 7.6 33.6 
3. Do about the 
same as the 
average 
Australian 
13.7 16.7 9.7 4.9 7.1 52.1 
4. Do a bit less 
than the average 
Australian 
2.4 1.3 0.7 0.3 0.2 5.0 
5. Do a lot less 
than the average 
Australian 
0.7 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.4 1.3 
Total (%) 20.0 27.6 20.0 14.1 18.2 100.0 
Note. N = 5219. Light grey cells are accurate estimators; white cells are self-deprecators; 
dark grey cells are self-enhancers. 
  
  





Self-other Assessments by Belief in Climate Change Causation 
  





Self-    
Deprecators 
 Not happening (n = 397) 62.7% 17.9% 19.4% 
Don’t know (n = 329) 52.0% 12.2% 35.9% 
Happening, but natural (n = 2023) 61.4% 20.0% 18.6% 
Happening and human induced (n = 2470) 53.1% 24.4% 22.5% 
 
  





Means, Standard Deviation and One-way ANOVA Results Comparing Self-Enhancers, 












2.39 (0.93) 2.24 (0.93)a 2.55 (0.91) b 2.64 (.87) b F(2, 4841) = 94.90, p < .001, η2 = .04 
Perceived 
Coping 
3.32 (0.90) 3.41 (0.90) a 3.24 (0.91) b 3.17 (0.84) b F(2, 5216) = 37.03, p < .001, η2 = .01 
Guilt 2.79 (1.03) 2.64 (1.04) a 2.92 (1.04) b 3.04 (0.95) c F(2, 5216) = 73.63, p < .001, η2 = .03 
Moral and 
Ethical duty 
3.44 (0.95) 3.92 (0.99) a 3.64 (0.89) b 3.61 (0.95) b F(2, 5216) = 83.94, p < .001, η2 = .03 
Injunctive 
norms 
3.02 (0.77) 2.91 (0.77) a 3.12 (0.76) b 3.24 (0.69) c F(2, 5216) = 89.00, p < .001, η2 = .03 
Descriptive 
norms 
3.22 (0.72) 3.11 (0.72) a 3.35 (0.71) b 3.40 (0.72) b F(2, 5216) = 92.29, p < .001, η2 = .03 
Note. Mean scores with different subscripts are significantly different on the basis of Tukey’s 
HSD test. 
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